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INTRODUCTION

"Economic integration" is an ambiguous term. Bela Balassa 1
notes several different forms of economic relationships between
states that represent varying degrees of economic integration. In
particular, he mentions categories representing five different
levels of relationships: a free trade area, a customs union, a common market, an economic union, and complete economic integration. 2 This analysis distributes different types of integration along
a continuum without suggesting that the lines of demarcation between the different categories are clear. All of the non-socialist
regional economic organizations fall somewhere along the continuum, but at any particular time they may be moving to a
greater level of integration or be in the process of shrinking to less. 3
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1. B. BALASSA, THE THEORY OF ECONOMIC INTEGRATION 2 (1961).
2. Balassa explains, id., that:
In a free-trade area, tariffs and quantitative restrictions between the participating countries are abolished, but each country retains its own tariffs against
nonmembers. Establishing a customs union involves, besides the suppression of
discrimination in the field of commodity movements within the union; the equalization of tariffs in trade with nonmember countries. A higher form of economic integration is attained in a common market, where not only trade restrictions but
also restrictions on factor movements are abolished. An economic union, as
distinct from a common market, combines the suppression of restrictions on commodity and factor movements with some degree of harmonization of national
economic policies, in order to remove discrimination that was due to disparities in
these policies. Finally, total economic integration presupposes the unification of
monetary, fiscal, social, and countercyclical policies and requires the setting-up of
a supra-national authority whose decisions are binding for the member states (footnote omitted).
3. The main ones are:
a. European Communities. Treaty Instituting the European Coal and Steel
Community, done 18 April 1951, 261 U.N.T.S. 140 (effective 23 July 1952);
Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, done 25 March
1957, 298 U.N.T.S. 11 (effective 1 Jan. 1958) (hereinafter Treaty of Rome);
Treaty Establishing the European Atomic Energy Community, done 25
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Indeed, as a legal, political, or merely descriptive concept, "integration" is commonly used to refer not only to the dictionary
meaning of integration as the combination of two or more units or

b.

c.

d.

e.

f.

g.

h.

i.

March 1957, 298 U.N.T.S. 167 (effective 1 Jan. 1958) (these three Communities represent in Balassa's terms at least a common market, with tendencies toward an economic union).
European Free Trade Area. Convention Establishing the European Free
Association, done 4 January 1960, 370 U.N.T.S. 5 (effective 3 May 1960) (free
trade area).
Latin American Free Trade Area. Treaty Establishing a Free Trade Area
and Instituting the Latin American Free Trade Association, 18 February
1960, reprinted in INTER-AMERICAN INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL LEGAL
STUDIES, INSTRUMENTS RELATING TO THE ECONOMIC INTEGRATION OF LATIN
AMERICA 207 (1968) (free trade area).
Central American Area. General Treaty on Central American Economic Integration, done 13 December 1960, 45 U.N.T.S. 3 (effective on ratification),
reprinted in INSTRUMENTS RELATING TO THE ECONOMIC INTEGRATION OF LATIN
AMERICA, supra at 23 (seems to be a free trade area, in spite of the more
grandiose sounding title).
Central African Area. Treaty Establishing a Central African Economic and
Customs Union, done 8 December 1964, reprinted in 4 INT'L LEGAL MAT'LS 669
(1965) (seems common market, perhaps more). Charter of the Union of Central African States, done 2 April 1968, reprinted in 7 INT'L LEGAL MAT'LS 725
(1968) (vague, perhaps customs union or even common market or economic
union). It is unclear as to the extent to which the second of these supersedes
the first and to the extent to which both are superseded by the Economic
Community of West African States, para. i. infra.
Australian-New Zealand Free Trade Area. New Zealand-Australia Free
Trade Agreement, done 31 August 1965, 554 U.N.T.S. 169 (effective 1 Jan.
1966) (free trade area).
Andean Subregion. Agreement on Andean Subregional Integration, done 26
May 1969, reprinted in 8 INT'L LEGAL MAT'LS 910 (1969); as amended by Andean Group: Treaty Establishing the Andean Parliament, done 25 October
1979, reprinted in 19 INT'L LEGAL MAT'LS 269 (1980); and Andean Group:
Agreement Establishing the Andean Council, done 12 November 1979,
reprinted in 19 INT'L LEGAL MAT'LS 612 (1980) (common market, perhaps
economic union). See generally F. GARCIA-AMADOR, THE ANDEAN LEGAL
ORDER: A NEW COMMUNITY LA w (1978). With the recent treaties creating additional organs, the Andean Group appears to have the most sophisticated
organization apart from the European Communities.
Caribbean Community Treaty Establishing the Caribbean Community, done 4
July 1973, reprinted in 12 INT'L LEGAL MAT'LS 1033 (1973). See discussion and
documents in H . GEISER, P. ALLEYNE & c. GAJRAJ. LEGAL PROBLEMS OF CARIBBEAN INTEGRATION: A STUDY OF THE LEGAL ASPECTS OF CARICOM (1976).
West African Area. Articles of Association for the Establishment of an
Economic Community of West Africa, 4 May 1967, 595 U.N.T.S. 287 (1967).
Treaty of the Economic Community of West African States, 28 May 1975,
reprinted in 14 INT'L LEGAL MAT'LS 1200 (1975). The latter agreement, which
has a broader membership, appears to supersede the former and may also do
the same to the Central African items in para. e, supra. See generally
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of some of their functions, but also to the dynamic process involved.
The movement towards economic integration proceeds on the
basic assumption that increasing the size of the unit will improve
the processes of production and distribution, through more efficient use of existing resources, and also through greater
development-the creation of more resources. This supposition is
nicely encapsulated in article 2 of the Treaty of Rome, the agreement which established the European Economic Community in
1957. It provides that:
[I]t shall be the aim of the Community, by establishing a Common
Market and progressively approximating the economic policies
of Member States, to promote throughout the Community a harmonious development of economic activities, a continuous and
balanced expansion, an increased stability, an accelerated raising of the standard of living and closer relations between its
Member States. 4
Zagaris, The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWASJ:
Analysis and Prospects, 10 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 93 (1978).
4. Treaty of Rome, art. 2. Article 3 goes on to provide:
For the purposes set out in the preceding Article, the activities of the Community
shall include under the conditions and with the timing provided for in this Treaty:
a. the elimination, as between Member States, of customs duties and of quantitative restrictions on the importation and exportation of goods, as well as of all
other measures with equivalent effect;
b. the establishment of a common customs tariff and a common commercial policy
towards third countries;
c. the abolition, as between Member States, of the obstacles to the free movement
of persons, services and capital;
d. the inauguration of a common agricultural policy;
e. the inauguration of a common transport policy;
f. the establishment of a system ensuring that competition shall not be distorted
in the Common Market;
g. the application of procedures which shall make it possible to co-ordinate the
economic policies of Member States and to remedy disequilibria in their
balances of payments;
h. the approximation of their respective municipal law to the extent necessary for
the functioning of the Common Market;
i. the creation of a European Social Fund in order to improve the possibilities
of employment for workers and to contribute to the raising of their standard of
living;
j. the establishment of a European Investment Bank intended to facilitate the
economic expansion of the Community through the creation of new resources;
and
k. the association of the overseas countries and territories with a view to increasing trade and to pursuing jointly their effort towards economic and social
development.
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The detailed application of goals like this varies between
developed and developing countries, and there is at least some
dispute about the extent to which integration theory applies to
developing countries. Balassa, the leading economic theorist on integration, asserts that:
[E]conomic integration in Europe serves to avoid discrimination
caused by trade-and-payments restrictions and increased state
intervention, and is designed to mitigate cyclical fluctuations
and to increase the growth of national income. In
underdeveloped countries, considerations of economic development are of basic importance; further contributing fal'tors are
imitative behavior and the endeavor to protect these economies
from possible adverse effects of European economic integration. 5

A further theoretical position espoused by some proponents
of economic integration is echoed in the final words of article 2 of
the Treaty of Rome which promote closer relations between the
States belonging to it. This is the position that economic integration is only a stop on the road to political integration. Some supporters of this approach assert that gradually increasing economic
integration will lead inevitably to political integration and some
kind of federal structure. Once enough progress has been made
with "technical matters," political unity will follow by some process of alchemy .6 I confess to considerable skepticism about this
notion, and the practical performance of existing organizations of
economic integration does little to support it.
The remarks that follow are devoted primarily to an examinaThe leading treatise in English on the Community is H. SMIT & P. HERZOG, THE LA w OF THE
EUROPEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY: A COMMENTARY ON THE EEC TREATY (1976). A casebook
crammed with useful material is E. STEIN, P. HAY & M. WAELBROECK, EUROPEAN COMMUNITY
LAW AND INSTITUTIONS IN PERSPECTIVE: TEXT, CASES AND READINGS (1976). The introductory
chapter of P. HAY, FEDERALISM AND SUPRANATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS: PATTERNS FOR NEW
LEGAL STRUCTURES (1966) is an excellent discussion of the concept of integration and the
whole book is full of thoughtful material about our subject in general. A useful introductory
work is D. LASOK & J. BRIDGE, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE LA w AND INSTITUTIONS OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES (3rd ed. 1976).
5. BALASSA, supra note 1, at 6.
6. I have in mind such works as E. HAAS, THE UNITING OF EUROPE: POLITICAL, SOCIAL
AND ECONOMIC FORCES, 1950-1957 (1958) and the same author's BEYOND THE NATION STATE:
FUNCTIONALISM AND INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION (1964). For a critical account of the Haas
"spill-over" theory and of related theories together with some doubts about the relevance of
United States analogies see Warnecke, American Regional Integration Theories and the
European Community 1971 INTEGRATION 1.
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tion of the principles and processes involved in the most
developed of the non-socialist regional economic groupings, the
European Communities. There are three overlapping Communities composed of the same ten states: the European Coal and
Steel Community (ECSC), the European Atomic Energy Agency
(EURATOM), and the European Economic Community (EEC).
Most of the specific remarks apply to the EEC but the general
remarks are applicable to all three. This paper will review three of
the most important features of the European Community viewed
as an exercise in integration: first, the effort to create supranational institutions; second, the creation of a distinct legal order;
and third, the treaty-making power of the Community. These are
by no means the only features that one might discuss. One
distinguished commentator 7 has suggested, inter alia, two other
crucial features, the automatic dismantlement of intra-community
trade barriers by means of a series of compulsory linear reductions, 8 and the inclusion of agriculture within the Treaty regime. 9
The scope of this paper will be confined, however, to the three
features indicated above. It will be noted that each of these three
points is related to the concept of the EEC as an example of
"supranationality ," a term (like "integration") of slippery meaning.
but a suggestive one nonetheless. As Inis Claude, Jr. says:
The concept of supranationality has not been precisely defined.
Some observers stress as crucial the capacity to make binding
decisions on important matters by majority vote, while others
emphasize the substantial authority conferred upon organs composed of persons other than governmental representatives, and
still others stress the competence of the agencies to deal directly
and authoritatively with firms and individuals within member
states. 10

7. Riesenfeld, Legal Systems of Regional Economic Integration, 22 AM. J . COMP. L.
415 (1974).
8. Referring to Treaty of Rome arts. 12-17, Riesenfeld, id. at 418, says "[t]he Treaty
wisely avoided the pitfalls of periodic product-by-product negotiations and utilized the initial
integrative momentum to achieve a fixed course of progress." (footnote omitted).
9. Id. at 419-420.
10. I. CLAUDE, JR., SWORDS INTO PLOWSHARES - THE PROBLEMS AND PltOGRESS OF INTER·
NATIONAL ORGANIZATION 109 (4th ed. 1971). While dealing with definitional matters, it should
perhaps be noted that the term "community" itself carries connotations of integration and
supranationality. See HAY. supra note 4 at 39-42.
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To these three instances of the use of the term "supranationality"
must be added a fourth- the transfer of power formerly exercised
by a sovereign state to an organization formed by a collectivity of
states. Even if the organ of the entity that exercises power is composed of governmental representatives, the dynamics of the exercise of power shift when it is the entity that is functioning rather
than the organs of constituent states. In what follows, whenever
the term "supranationality" appears, it will be used with at least
one of these four connotations, a theme which shall be summarized
in the conclusion of this paper.
It is worth no~ing the influence of United States thinking on the
political and jurisprudential bases of economic integration. Both in
Europe 11 and elsewhere 12 the United States has encouraged integration as a path to economic growth. Whether this encouragement has been for altruistic reasons, such as the recovery of
Europe from the devastation of war, and the lessening of FrancoGerman rivalry, or for more cynical reasons of profit, may be
argued. As has been remarked in terms that are as applicable to
Europe as to the area to which they were addressed, "it may be
that [the United States'] warmth towards a Latin American Common Market was due to its belief that the chief beneficiaries of the
market would be the United States transnational corporations
rather than the Latin American countries." 13 Whatever the reason
for political support, United States jurisprudential thinking on the
nature of federalism, and in particular the role of a court having
power to make binding decisions on matters affecting the
"federal" power and structure, are apparent. 14 This is not to suggest that the structure of the EEC has reached a point similar to
that of the thirteen original States after the adoption of the
United States Constitution in 1789. The point is that analogies,
and perhaps hopes and aspirations, derived from the American ex11. Anthony, Comments on the Common Market, 41 WASH. L. REV. 423, 424 (1966).
12. Vargas-Hidalgo, The Process of Integration in Latin America, 15 COMP. JuR. REV.
105, 130-132 (1978).
13. Id. at 131.
14. See, e.g., P. HAY. FEDERALISM AND SUPRANATIONAL ORGANIZATION: PATTERNS FOR
NEW LEGAL STRUCTURES (1966); Schoenbaum, The Growth of Judicial Power in the European Economic Community, 48 N. CAROLINA L. REV. 32, 33 (1969), discussing the "recent

history of the Court of Justice as involving quasi-constitutional crises strikingly similar to
those faced by the Supreme Court of the United States in its early history."
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perience have been present in the minds of proponents of regional
integration.

IL THE EFFORT TO CREATE
SUPRANATIONAL INSTITUTIONS
It is possible to arrange international economic integration in

such a way as to create no structural relationships involving
supranational organs, and little or no interference with national
sovereignty. Action can be taken within such a framework by
means of traditional diplomatic negotiations leading to universal
consent, or at least to general consent, not binding on those parties not in agreement. Decisions so reached have effect only on the
international plane and require the intervention of organs of the
state before any question of their domestic enforceability arises. It
is, on the other hand, possible to create a structure of a different
nature with organs exercising .legislative, executive or judicial
functions, having power to act by a majority, and having a direct
effect in the legal order of member states. This latter kind of arrangement involves some loss of power (sovereignty) on the part
of member states and its concomitant transfer to the international
organization. The EEC is an organization of this kind. As we shall
see, the transfer of sovereignty is only partial, with the issue of
the extent to which it will develop in considerable doubt. The role
of the organs of the EEC in the integrative process has been explained as follows by a judge of the European Court:
The Treaties establishing the Communities, from the point of
view of substantive law, have merely laid down certain elementary rules relating primarily to the solution of immediate problems. The distance remaining to be covered from these points of
departure to the final objective of customs and economic union
must be covered by means of legislation, the formulation of
which is entrusted to the common institutions. 15

We turn then to an examination of each of the main organs of
the Community to examine its role in contributing to the lawmaking of the Community. Article 4 of the Treaty of Rome creates
four "institutions" by which "[t]he achievement of the tasks en15.

P. PESCATORE. THE LAW OF INTEGRATION : EMERGENCE OF A NEW PHENOMENON IN IN-

TERNATIONAL RELATIONS, nASED ON THE EXPERIENCE OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES

58

(1974).
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trusted to the Community shall be ensured": an Assembly, a
Council, a Commission and a Court of J ustice. 16 Following a discussion of these four organs, it will be necessary to say something
about an increasingly important body not mentioned in the Treaty
but developed in the practice of the Community, the European
Council.

A.

The Assembly

Both in respect of the powers granted it under the Treaty of
Rome 11 and the role it has played in the life of the community,
the Assembly or European Parliament is the least significant of
the institutions in the process of integration. It consists of
representatives of States Members who until 1979 were
designated from among the members of the respective
Parliaments but more recently have been elected by direct suffrage to a five-year term. 18 However, it does not have the
legislative powers, the right of initiative or even the power of the
purse normally possessed by a national Parliament.
Article 137 of the Treaty of Rome says that the Assembly
"shall exercise the powers of deliberation and of control which are
conferred upon it by this Treaty." Such powers must therefore be
gleaned from an examination of various specific provisions of the
Treaty of Rome. Thus, several articles of the Treaty confer on the
Assembly the right to give advice on the formulation of Community legislation which is adopted by the Council or the Commission in
the form of Regulations, Directives and Decisions. 19 The procedure
16. Almost as an afterthought, art. 4 states: "The Council and the Commission shall
be assisted by an Economic and Social Committee acting in a consultative capacity." This
Committee has members selected from labor, management, agricultural, consumer and
family organizations. The Committee provides some expertise as well as input from
pressure groups, but it has not played a large role in the life of the Community and no further discussion of it is proposed. Such detail concerning it as the Treaty provides is in articles 193-198.
17. Articles 137-144. On the Assembly, see generally V. HERMAN & J. LODGE, THE
EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY (1978).
18. See Council Decision 76/787, 19 0. J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 278) 5 (1976), which required
adoption by Member States in accordance with their respective constitutional requ•rements
and Council Decision 78/639, 20 O. J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 205) 75 (1978), fixing the period for the
first election.
19. Articles 7 (rules designed to prohibit discrimination on grounds of nationality),
14.7 (reduction of customs duties), 43.2 (common agricultural policy), 54.2 and 56.2 (right of
establishment), 57.1 (mutual recognition of diplomas, certificates and other evidence of formal qualifications). Article 189 of the Treaty describes Community legislation:
For the achievemant of their aims and under the conditions provided for in this
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for major legislation is as follows: the Commission submits a formal proposal to the Council which is sent to the Assembly with a
request for its opinion. In due course an opinion is sent to the
Council and the Commission, but it has no binding effect. Given a
modicum of good faith by the Council, the Assembly's views will
carry some weight but the Assembly is by no stretch of the imagination akin to a house of a legislature so far as law-making is
concerned. Since 1975, the impact of the Assembly's views in some
areas has been increased by the Council's acquiescence in the socalled "concertation procedure." While the power of the Council
has not been formally reduced, that body has agreed to meet with
the Assembly to discuss differences of opinion on Community acts
having financial implications. A "concertation" committee of Council representatives, members of the Assembly's political groups
and Commission representatives is established to seek an accommodation.20
The Assembly also possesses "supervisory" powers. First,
article 140 of the Treaty of Rome requires the Commission to reply orally or in writing to questions put to it by the Assembly or
its members. This power to ask questions has been much used in
practice and permits some policy influence akin to that exercised
in national parliaments by questions from back-benchers. The
practice has also arisen of asking questions of the Council which
usually answers them, although there seems to be no legal requirement that it do so. Second, the Commission must submit an annual
report to the Assembly, which must discuss it in open session. 21
There is then a valuable opportunity for a wide-ranging debate on
the Community's activities. Third, the Assembly, by means of a
motion of censure adopted by a two-thirds majority, may exercise
a power akin to that granted by the motion of no-confidence procedure to a legislature in a British Parliamentary system, to force
Treaty, the Council and the Commission shall adopt regulations and directives,
make decisions and formulate recommendations or opinions.
Regulations shall have a general application. They shall be binding in every
respect and directly applicable in each Member State.
Directives shall bind any Member State to which they are addressed, as to the
result to be achieved, while leaving to domestic agencies a competence as to form
and means.
Decisions shall be binding in every respect for the addressees named therein.
Recommendations and opinions shall have no binding force.
20. See discussion in HERMAN & LODGE , supra note 17, at 32.
21. Treaty of Rome art. 143.
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the members of the Commission to resign as a body. 22 However,
the members of the Commission are appointed by the common accord of the governments of the Member States 23 and the
Assembly has no direct influence on their replacements. Furthermore, members of the Commission, notwithstanding a motion of
censure, continue to serve until replaced in accordance with the
common accord procedure. 24 It will therefore come as no surprise
that the censure procedure is largely a dead letter; as of 1979 only
three motions of censure, all of them unsuccessful, had taken
place. 25 There is, in fact, one overriding reason why the sanction is
unlikely to be applied. Being committed, in theory at least, to the
"European view," the Assembly is more likely to find itself allied
with the Commission in opposition to the Council than it is to be at
loggerheads with the Commission. It has no power beyond debate
and publicity to make its point in any dispute with the Council.
The Assembly lacks other supervisory powers that might be
expected of a parliament. No budgetary functions were given to
the Assembly under the Treaty of Rome; the power of the purse
is, of course, the classic way in which a legislature can assert
itself. Of recent years tentative steps have been taken to give the
Assembly some power in this respect but it is too soon to tell how
significant those developments will prove to_ be. 26 Again, the
Assembly plays no part in the appointment of the members of the
Court of Justice. The judges, like the members of the Commission,
are appointed by common consent of the governments. 27
In sum:
At present, the Parliament contributes little toward the
legitimation of the exercise of sovereign powers by the other institutions of the Community. Although it represents most directly the ideal of people's sovereignty, the Parliament is granted
very limited powers to participate in decision-making. Moreover,
22. Treaty of Rome art. 144.
23. Treaty Constituting a Single Council and a Single Commission of the European
Communities (1965) art. 11 [hereinafter Merger Treaty].
24. Treaty of Rome art. 144.
25. Muller-Graff, Direct Elections to the European Parliament, 11 CASE W. RES. J.
INT'L L. 1, 26 n. 119 (1979).
26. See the Treaty amending certain financial provisions of the Treaties establishing
the European Communities and of the Treaty establishing a Single Council and a Single
Commission of the European Communities, July 22, 1975, 20 0. J. Eun. COMM. (No. L 359) (1977)
(effective 1 June 1977).
27. Treaty of Rome art. 167.
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the Parliament has only a very weak authority to supervise the
activities of the Commission. 28

Whether direct elections of Assembly members will lead to pressures for a larger supranational role for the Assembly remains to
be seen. In principle, direct elections by t~e people ought to result
in greater legitimacy for the Assembly. In practice, given the fact
that the membership was elected by different procedures in different states and that the voting turnout was extremely low in
some cases (32% in Britain and 47.8% in Denmark), 29 the new composition of the Assembly may exacerbate national differences,
rather than enhance the integrative process.

B.

The Council of Ministers

The Council consists of representatives of Member States. 30
Each government is to delegate to it one of its members (typically
this is the Minister of Foreign Affairs). The general functions of
the Council are rather tersely defined in the Treaty. Article 145
provides:
With a view to ensuring the achievement of the objectives laid
down in this Treaty, and under the conditions provided for
therein, the Council shall: ensure the co-ordination of the general
economic policies of the Member States, and dispose of a power
of decision.

In fact, the power to take decisions is representative of much
broader specific powers found elsewhere in the Treaty of Rome
which make the Council the chief legislative body of the Community- a legislative body with authority over quite a large area
of activity directly affecting Member States. Acting on a proposal
by the Commission, the Council has power to make Regulations,
issue Directives, take Decisions, make Recommendations or
deliver Opinions. 31 In numerous law-making contexts the Council
has power under the terms of the Treaty to act on a Commission
recommendation by means of either a simple or a "qualified"
28. Muller-Graff, supra note 25 at 27-28.
29. See the analysis of election results in Keesing's Contemporary Archives 29893 ff
(26 October 1979) entitled "European Communities-Direct Elections to European
Parliament-National Campaigns and Results-Elected Members-Inaugural Session."
30. Merger Treaty art. 2.
31. Treaty of Rome art. 189, supra note 19.
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(weighted) majority. 32 The Council, however, has normally tried to
ensure unanimity. Indeed, following a crisis in Community relations in 1965, an agreement was reached among the then six
members of the Community, the effect of which was that decisions
were only to be made unanimously. 33 A later Delphic statement by
the Heads of Government of the nine members in 197434 pulls back
some from the understanding reached at Luxembourg in January
1966, but the search for unanimity continues, to the occasional
point of paralysis, and the provisions of the Treaty of Rome containing power to act by a majority are not fully invoked. Thus, the
powers of the Council to act in the field of law-making by majority
vote have remained more in the area of theory and potential than
of actual application. Nevertheless, as we shall see in the section
on the Community as a distinct legal order, 35 the Council's lawmaking activities have had a profound effect upon the juridical
order of the Community and of its Member States.

C.

The Commission

The members of the Council are representatives of states.
The Commission is plainly designed to add an element of supranationality into the Community, in the form of officials who are not
representatives of governments. The Commission consists of thir32. In a weighted majority vote France, Germany, Italy, and the United Kingdom
have ten votes each, Belgium and the Netherlands, five each, Denmark and Ireland, three
each, and Luxembourg has two. Treaty of Rome art. 148. Forty-one votes in favor are
necessary which prevents the "big four" from ganging up on the smaller states. Id.
33. See BULL. EUR. COMM. 3-1966, point 3.9:
b. Majority voting procedure
I. Where, iu the case of decisions which may be taken by majority vote on a proposal of the Commission, very important interests of one or more partners are at
stake, the Members of the Council will endeavour, within a reasonable time, to
reach solutions which can be adopted by all the Members of the Council while
respecting their mutual interests and those of the Community, in accordance with
Article 2 of the Treaty.
II. With regard to the preceding paragraph, the French delegation considers that
where very important interests are at stake the discussion must be continued until
unanimous agreement is reached.
III. The six delegations note that there is a divergence of views on what should be
done in the event of a failure to reach complete agreement.
IV. The six delegations nevertheless consider that this divergence does not prevent the Community's work being resumed in accordance with the normal procedure.
34. BULL. EUR. COMM. 12-1974, point 1104.
35. See text accompanying notes 56-71 infra.
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teen members chosen on the basis of "general competence" and
whose "independence is beyond doubt." 36 "Their duties," in the
words of a distinguished writer, "are primarily to adopt a European posture." 37 In the performance of their duties Commission
members are forbidden to take instructions from any government
or from any other body. Each Member State undertakes to respect
this principle and not to seek to influence the members of the
Commission in their tasks. 38 Commission members hold office for a
renewable term of four years. They act by majority vote. They
have at their disposal a very large staff, the major bureaucracy of
the Community. It is organized into departments called
directorates-general. These directorates prepare proposals for the
Commission and may consult experts from national governments,
or trade, management, agriculture, or labor pressure groups. The
Commission's stock-in-trade is information.
The general powers of the Commission are set out in article
155 of the Treaty of Rome. First, it must ensure that the provisions of the Treaty and the measures taken by the institutions
pursuant thereto are applied. Under this general rubric, it may
even bring a member before the Court of Justice if it considers
that the member has failed to fulfill an obligation under the Treaty, including Regulations, Directives and Decisions made pursuant
thereto. 39 Typically, it tries to exercise its powers of persuasion
before taking such a drastic course and it is usually able to get
compliance without litigation. 40 Second, it is required to make
36. Merger Treaty art. 10.
37. Thompson, The Common Market: A New Legal Order, 41 WASH. L. REV. 385, 387
(1966).
38. Merger Treaty art. 10.
39. Treaty of Rome art. 169.
40. The Commission's 13th General Report on the Activities of the European Communities 1979 (1980) at 279 records that:
The upward trend of the past few years in the number of infringement procedures
under Article 169 of the EEC Treaty against Member States accelerated during
1979 with 180 new cases being opened. The number of cases reaching the subsequent stages of the procedure also showed a marked increase; 79 reasoned opinions were delivered and 18 new cases were brought before the Court.
The breakdown by subject matter of the infringements presents a slightly different picture from previous years. The dominant sector remained that of the free
movement of goods, including agricultural products, these infringements accounting for half of the new procedures in 1979. Increased Community activity in certain
sectors, however, has led to a wider spread of the remaining cases, which cover
right of establishment, social affairs (particularly equal pay), the environment,
transport, taxation and fisheries.

Published by SURFACE, 1980

13

Syracuse Journal of International Law and Commerce, Vol. 8, No. 1 [1980], Art. 2

14

Syr. J. Int'l L. & Com.

[Vol. 8:1

various recommendations pursuant to specific provisions of the
Treaty of Rome and it also has a general power to make recommendations on matters dealt with in the Treaty if it considers
such action necessary .41 Third, it is given some powers of decision,42 and participates in the legislative process by submitting
proposals. 43 Finally, it exercises power conferred upon it by the
Council for the detailed implementation of rules laid down by the
Council. In volume, a significant quantity of the "secondary," i.e.,
non-treaty, law of the Community is in the form of instruments
adopted by the Commission acting on authority delegated by the
Council.
The Commission is designed as the prime catalyst in the integrative process and as an independent voice to speak for the
wider interests of the Community, as opposed to those of its
Member States. Nevertheless, it is at the mercy of the Council of
Ministers so far as substantial norm-creating activities are concerned. In practice, it spends much more of its efforts than one
might have expected simply from reading the Treaty in seeking to
obtain consensus by political means.

D.

The Court of Justice

The decisions of the Court of Justice and their acceptance by
national courts and governments constitute a remarkable example
of supranationalism. ·
The Court consists of one judge from each Member State appointed by agreement of the governments to a term of six years,
but eligible for reappointment. 44 Article 164 describes the general
function of the Court-to "ensure observance of law in the interpretation and application of this Treaty." It has jurisdiction in five
main areas relevant to the legal order of the Community. 45
41. Treaty of Rome art. 155.
42. Particularly the power of derogation from Treaty obligations in case of emergencies whi~h was exercisable during the transitional period before the Treaty of Rome came
fully into effect. See Treaty art. 226. Article 189 of the Treaty, supra note 19, perhaps gives
the impression that the Commission has more independent legislative power than is really
the case. Most of its legislative output is based on power delegated by the Council.
43. See, e.g., supra note 19, for examples, all of which require a proposal from the
Commission, as well as the opinion of the Assembly before the Council may act.
44. Treaty of Rome art. 167.
45. It also has other minor areas of competence including that under art. 179 of the
Treaty of Rome in employment disputes between the Community and its servants. On the
Court as integrator, see A. GREEN, POLITICAL INTEGRATION BY JURISPRUDENCE (1969).
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First, article 169 of the Treaty of Rome provides that if the
Commission considers that a Member State has failed to fulfill an
obligation under the Treaty, the Commission is to deliver a
reasoned opinion on the matter after giving the state concerned an
opportunity to submit its observations. If the state does not
comply with the Commission's opinion, the Commission may bring
the matter before the Court. The Commission has used this power
several times. 46
Second, in a similar fashion, under article 170, if a Member
State considers that another Member State has failed to comply
with its Treaty obligations, it may bring the matter before the
Court after first having taken it to the Commission. As is the case
with other state-against-state enforcement procedures, (for example, in the human rights area), states are reluctant to make use of
the article 170 procedure. However, the Court last year rendered
its first decision in an article 170 case, finding in favor of France
in a case in which that country alleged that the United Kingdom
was in breach of the Treaty of Rome in adopting certain fishing
regulations. 47
The Court's decisions under both articles 169 and 170 are not
merely advisory. Article 171 provides that if the Court finds that a
Member State has failed to fulfill an obligation under the Treaty,
the Member State shall be required to take the necessary
measures to comply with the judgment of the Court.
Third, article 173 of the Treaty of Rome empowers the Court
to review the legality of the acts of the Council and the Commission other than recommendations or opinions, the latter having no
dispositive legal effect. For this purpose it has jurisdiction in actions brought by a Member State, by the Council, by the Commission, or in the case of any person, against a decision which,
although in the form of a Regulation or a Decision addressed to
another person, is of direct and individual concern to the former.
The grounds for which nullity may be alleged are lack of competence, infringement of an essential procedural requirement, infringement of the Treaty of Rome or any rule of law relating to its
application, and misuse of powers. If one of these grounds is
established, the Court must declare that the act concerned is
void.'8
46. Thirteenth General H.eport, supra note 40.
47. Id. at 281.
48. Treaty of Rome art. 17 4.
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Fourth, article 177 of the Treaty of Rome grants the Court
jurisdiction to make "preliminary rulings" concerning matters
arising in proceedings before national courts concerning (a) the interpretation of the Treaty, (b) the validity and interpretation of
acts of the institutions of the Community, (c) the interpretation of
the statutes of bodies established by an act of the Council where
those statutes so provide. According to the third paragraph of article 177, when such a question arises before an inferior tribunal in
a Member State and that tribunal considers a ruling on the point
necessary to reach a judgment, it may request the European
Court to give a ruling thereon. A domestic court of last resort
must so request. Procedurally, matters. referred to the European
Court under article 177 will usually arise in a national court either
in cases between private parties or between a private party and a
government (usually that of the forum state) in which one of the
parties relies upon the Treaty or an act of the Community as the
basis for its legal position. Sovereign sensitivities of domestic
courts are protected by the reference to "preliminary rulings" in
article 177. The European Court does not reach down and decide
the case as such. It leaves it to the national court to apply its rulings to the facts of the particular situation. Needless to say, those
preliminary rulings will often be determinative of the result in
domestic litigation.
In terms of the Court's caseload and its contribution to the
ongoing process of integration, article 177 is the most significant
of the bases of the Court's jurisdiction. As Judge Pescatore has
noted in his excellent work on The Law of Integration:
The really original innovation of the Treaties of Rome has been
to set up for the application of Community law a direct relationship between judicial powers, a relationship which is much more
than mere consultation: a relationship on the basis of jurisdiction
and powers. Henceforth, it is the exercise of the judicial office
itself that is shared, following well-defined conceptions, between
the Community level and the national level. From this flows an
integrating effect, the scope and depth of which experience alone
can measure. 49
49. PESCATORE, supra note 15, at 91. See also Raworth, Article 177 of the Treaty of
Rome and the Evolution of the Doctrine of the Supremacy of Community Law, [1977] CAN.
Y.B. lNT'L L. 276.
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Nonetheless, the integrating tendencies of article 177 may be
sabotaged by domestic tribunals at two stages of the process- by
failing to make requests for rulings to the Court of Justice or by
finding some way to avoid applying its rulings once they have
been made. Both kinds of evasion have taken place. Professor Buxbaum noted in 1969 that there were significant numbers of cases
where a request might have been expected but was not made. 50
This problem has perhaps diminished but it has not vanished with
the passage of time. The most recent Report of the Commission of
the Communities notes that, although in several other instances
the French Conseil d'Etat has made referrals to the Court, it had
with its decision in the Cohn Bendit case of 12 December 1978,
failed to fulfill its obligation to do so under article 177 of the Treaty. 51 The Conseil had furthermore disregarded case law of the
Court which gave "direct effect" (so that individuals could rely
upon it in national courts) to a Council Directive on coordination of
special measures concerning the movement and residence of
foreign nationals which are justified on grounds of public policy,
public security or public health. The Commission's report 52 states
that "[t]he Commission has informed the French Government of its
grave concern on this matter." More shall be said about the problem created when national courts ignore the Community Court's
advice in a later section of this paper dealing with the Community
as a new legal order. 53
Fifth, the final jurisdictional base of the Court which should
be mentioned is article 178, which gives the Court jurisdiction
over damage actions against the Community based on noncontractual (tort) liability for the acts of Community institutions,
officials, or employees. Suits for the tortious acts of the supranational organs thus come before a supranational Court.

E.

The European Council

A body not envisaged by the Treaty of Rome has been playing an increasing role in the work of the Community. This is the
meeting of Heads of State or Government referred to as the Euro-

REV.

50. Buxbaum, Article 177 of the Rome Treaty as a Federalizing Device, 21
1041 (1969).
51. 13th General Report, supra note 40, at 278.
52. Id.
53. See notes 64-71 infra.
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pean Council, a name which causes some confusion between it and
the Council of the Communities. The European Council had its
origin in the need to hold periodic high level meetings to consider
matters which were of common concern to the members of the
Community but which did not come strictly within the ambit of
the Treaty of Rome. Heads of State or of Government had met irregularly throughout the life of the Community, and this practice
was formalized in December of 1974. 54 Establishing the position of
this new body perhaps represents the entrenchment of another
rival for the Commission, another political rather than supranational power center. The President of the Commission has put
about the best appearance he can on the matter in these words:
In this way [meetings of the European Council] the Heads of
Government are being closely identified with the construction of
Europe; this, in turn, enhances the significance of Europe in the
eyes of the Community citizen. The distinction between matters
falling strictly within the Community's competence and those
concerned with foreign policy is now being played down, rather
than, as at one time, emphasized. This must be the correct approach, because we are looking at two sides of the same coin; at
the end of the day, political and economic union become inseparable.55

Ill

THE CREATION OF A DISTINCT LEGAL ORDER

Article 164 of the Treaty of Rome, as has already been mentioned,56 provides that the Court of Justice is to ensure that what
is tantalizingly called "the law" is observed. One might reasonably
ask which "law" is to be observed and what is its juridical nature.
Some answers can be given to these questions on the basis of the
Treaty itself and practice pursuant to it. 57 What is involved is not
54. See discussions in Jenkins, The European Community as It Faces Its Second
Enlargement, 18 VA . J. INT'L L. 381, 384 (1978).
55. Id. at 384-385.
56. See text supra note 45.
57. See generally PESCATORE, supra note 15, at 74-76. Pescatore suggests that:
[t]he English version of Article 164 does not precisely convey the sense of the
original, and especially the French and German texts. A fully adequate translation
would have said that the Court of Justice is entrusted with the task of 'ensuring
observation of the rule of law' in the interpretation and application of the Treaty.
This would have opened a much deeper insight into the fundamentals of the Community than the present version which, alas, has become authentic. Id. at 74, n.
12a.
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merely the law of Member States, or some general doctrines of international law, but the law of a new regime, "Community law."
So far as its formal sources are concerned, the primary source is
the law laid down in the Treaty of Rome, which not only sets out
rights and obligations of an international nature, but also amounts
to the basic constitutional document of the organization. The second major source of Community law is often described as "Community secondary law," that is to say, the Regulations, Directives
and Decisions made by the Council of Ministers and the Commission. A third source, perhaps of increasing importance, is that of
general principles common to the Member States. 58 In one instance, at least, this source is specifically mentioned in the Treaty
of Rome. This is in article 215 where the relevant tort rules in the
case of suits against the Community are said to be "the general
principles common to the laws of Member States." The
jurisprudence of the Court of Justice had indicated, however, that
such general principles may be available in other contexts also,
such as the protection of human rights, and to provide the content
of "the law" as understood in article 164. 59
So far as the juridical nature of Community law is concerned,
this involves looking at the way in which it differs from domestic
law or from international law and its place in the legal order of a
particular Member State. These matters have been dealt with
from various points of view in the Community Court and the
courts of the Member States.
The first important consideration by the Community Court
was in the Van Gend en Loos case in 1963. 60 The plaintiff, a Dutch
company, imported a quantity of a chemical into the Nether lands
58. Recall in this context the reference amongst the sources of law which the International Court of Justice is to apply to "the general principles of law recognized by civilized
nations." STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE art. 38. The general principles
of the Community states are not necessarily the same as those of the whole spectrum of
"civilized nations."
59. See, e.g., Nold v. Commission, Case No. 4/73 [1974] E.C.R. 491, 507-08. PESCATORE,
supra note 15, at 74 also gives as sources of Community law (a) "comparative law" and (b)
the "growth of custom," for example, methods of cooperation between the Commission, the
Council and the Parliament. It is difficult to see. how his comparative law is different from
other writers' general principles. The kind of custom he mentions is close to the British notion of the customs or conventions of the constitution - for example, the rule, not laid down
in statute, that a Minister defeated by a motion of no-confidence must resign.
60. Van Gend en Loos v. Netherlands Inland Revenue Administration, Case No. 26/62
(1963] E.C.R. 1.
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from Germany. It was required, pursuant to a statute which
brought into force for The Nether lands a modification of the
BENELUX tariff resulting from the acceptance by the BENELUX
nations of a new customs nomenclature, to pay duty at the rate of
8% ad valorem. The pl~intiff later claimed back the duty paid in
the appropriate administrative tribunal, the Tariff Commission in
Amsterdam. It argued that the imposition of the duty at 8% infringed article 12 of the Treaty of Rome. The reasoning was that
before the date of the entry into force of the Treaty of Rome, the
import duty on the chemical from Germany to The Netherlands
was 3%, and article 12 prohibited Member States from increasing
customs duties on imports from other Member States after the
Treaty came into effect. The issue was referred to the Community
Court pursuant to article 177 of the Treaty. The Court of Justice
held that the provisions of article 12 were self-executing, in the
sense that no further action such as a Regulation or Directive by
Community organs was necessary to give effect to them, and that
they could be invoked by the private party in the Dutch proceeding. Most important for the present discussion, the Court
referred as follows to the nature of Community law:
The conclusion to be drawn from this is that the Community constitutes a new legal order of international law for the benefit of
which the states have limited their sovereign rights, albeit
within limited fields, and the subjects of which comprise not only
Member States but also their nationals. Independently of the
legislation of Member States, Community law therefore not only
imposes obligations on individuals but is also intended to confer
upon them rights which become part of their legal heritage.
These rights arise not only where they are expressly granted by
the Treaty, but also by reason of obligations which the Treaty
imposes in a clearly defined way upon individuals as well as upon
the Member States and upon the institutions of the Community .61

Implicit in the Court's analysis in the Van Gend case is a notion of
the supremacy of- Community law in a conflict with national law,
even a national law later in time, and an expectation that Community law would be applied by national courts in the event of a
conflict. The Court made this explicit when it returned to the
special nature of Community law the following year in Costa v.
61. Id.
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E.N.E.L ..62 That case concerned the compatibility of the nationalization of an Italian electricity company with certain provisions of the Treaty of Rome. The Court strongly supported the
view that Italian laws subsequent to the Treaty must give way if
they are inconsistent with the Treaty and ought not to be applied
by Italian courts. It again asserted that members of the Community have limited their sovereign rights permanently. "Consequently Article 177 is to be applied regardless of any domestic law,
whenever questions relating to the interpretation of the Treaty
arise." 63
It is only fair to add that national courts are not always as enthusiastic about the supremacy of Community law as is the Community Court. Several members of the Community have constitutional or other legal rules that afford supremacy to Community
norms; 64 others do not. A provision in the French Constitution
which arguably gives supremacy to treaty norms over subsequent
legislation, has not always been so interpreted by French courts,
especially the administrative courts headed by the Conseil
d'Etat. 65 In the Costa v. E.N.E.L. proceedings, the Italian Supreme
Court ultimately succeeded in avoiding applying the European
Court's opinion by the familiar device of finding that Costa, a
shareholder in the nationalized company, had no standing to sue. 66
(The lower court which had requested the preliminary ruling had
followed the Community Court's reasoning to find the nationalization void.) Later in the Frontini case, 67 the Italian Constitutional
Court upheld the supremacy of Community law in light of article
11 of the Italian Constitution, which enables Italy to consent equal62. Case No. 6/64 [1964] C.M.L.R. 429.
63. Id.
64. See material in STEIN, supra note 4, at 94-108; Warner, The Relationship Between
European Community Law and the National Laws of Member States, 93 L.Q. REV. 349
(1977). The Netherlands Constitution contains such a provision. In theory, therefore, the
plaintiff in Van Gend should have had no difficulty in succeeding when the case went back to
the Tariff Commission following the European Court's preliminary ruling. However, the
situation was confused because there was also a BENELUX obligation involved and the
Constitution does not seem to give a ready answer to the question of primacy of conflicting
treaty obligations if, as it appears, that was the case. I have not noticed anything in the
literature that says what the Tariff Commission did next.
65. See Warner, supra note 64, 361-632; the Commission's complaint, supra note 40;
and E. BERGSTEN, COMMUNITY LA w IN THE FRENCH COURTS: THE LA w OF TREATIES IN MODERN
ATTIRE (1973).
66. STEIN, supra note 4, at 211.
67. [197 4] C.M.L.R. 372.
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ly with other states to limit its sovereignty "in so far as this may
be necessary to enable the creation of any organization assuring
peace and justice among nations." In a subsequent judgment,
however, the Constitutional Court, while affirming the principles
of Frontini, held that only it had power to declare an Italian
statute void on the ground of its incompatibility with Community
law. The fly in the ointment here is that another rule of the
Court's constitutional jurisprudence is that a decision of the Court
voiding a statute has only prospective effect. It does not apply in
the particular proceedings. This is, of course, of little consolation
to the litigant in the particular case and is far from what the Community Court had in mind.
In short, the Community Court has spoken of a new legal
order, distinct from general rules of international law and from
the old legal orders of Member States. It has asserted and
reiterated 69 its position on the supremacy of Community norms
bluntly and clearly. On the other hand, its views are sometimes ignored or side-stepped by national courts. The European Court's
strategy is apparently to concede that it may lose a few rounds in
the near future, and to hope for a little moral support from the
Commission, 70 and hope also that in the long run the integrative
process will take hold and its view will prevail in all Member
States. In an extra-judicial statement, Judge Pescatore, referring
to the problem of national courts, has suggested that "[t]hey [national courts] must face up to the difficulty, and it is hard to see
how in the long term they could remain impervious to a logic
which has been so clearly and imperatively put before them." 11

IV.

TREATY-MAKING POWER

The last of the "supranational" aspects of the European Communities to be reviewed is that of the treaty-making power of the
68. I.c.I.c. v. Ministero del Commercio con l'Estero, case 232/75, II, Consiglio di Sta to,
1975, No. 10, Pt. II, p. 1104, as cited in Warner, supra note 64, at 363.
69. E.g., Italian Finance Administration v. Simmenthal S.p.A., Case No. 106/77 [1978]
E.C.R. 629, where the Court attacked the Italian practice referred to in the case cited supra
note 68, in these words:
[T]he national courts must protect rights conferred by provisions of the Community legal order and .. . it is not necessary for such courts to request or await the actual setting aside by the national authorities empowered so to act of any national
measures which might impede the direct and immediate application of Community
rules.
70. As in the incident described in notes 51-52 supra.
71. PESCATORE, supra note 15, at 98.
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EEC. This matter has recently received some prominence in the
context of efforts to draft a new Law of the Sea Convention. 72 The
members of the Ten have been arguing, amidst a chorus of skepticism from certain other participants in the Law of the Sea Conference, that in some fields covered by the proposed Convention,
Member States have transferred their legal powers to the Community. The latter must therefore be permitted to become a party
to the Convention in order that all the objectives thereof may be
fulfilled. On another front, in 1979, the Commission of the Communities produced a widely-discussed memorandum entitled Accession of the Communities to the European Convention on
Human Rights. 13 The memorandum argues that it may be
desirable for the Communities to become a party to the Convention on Human Rights in order to fully protect human rights from
infringement by Community organs. An amending Protocol by the
present parties to the Convention would be necessary to change
its final clauses so as to make accession by the Community possible. The Commission's memorandum makes the rather telling
point that "[a]ccession of the Community to an international
mechanism of legal control would underline its own personality ." 74
Perhaps the discussions concerning the Law of the Sea and the
European Convention should both be seen in light of assertions of
supranationality by the Community and the attempt to have tha:t
position recognized by other international actors.
To understand these two initiatives, it is necessary to look
back at developments on the wider international plane as well as
practice within the Community itself. That international organizations may be subjects of international law, and may in particular
be parties to international agreements, has been generally accepted since the Advisory Opinion of the International Court of
Justice on Reparation for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the
72. See Koers, Participation of the European Economic Community in the New Law
of the Sea Convention, 73 AM. J. INT'L L. 426 (1979). Note that the Community also exercises
foreign affairs power by means of legation. Representatives of over 100 states are accredited to the Community. The Community has observer missions at the U.N. and
Specialized Agencies. On the treaty-making power in general, see Kuznetsov, Possibilities
for Cooperation Between COMECON and the European Economic Community, 17 SOVIET
L. & GOV'T. 47 (1978-79); Leopold, External Relations Power of EEC in Theory and Practice,
26 INT'L & COMP. L. Q. 54 (1977).
73. BULL. EUR. COMM. Supp. 2-1979.
74. Id. at 12.
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United Nations. 75 For the most part, such personality in general,
and treaty-making capacity in particular must be gleaned from
somewhat ambiguous constitutional . documents of international
organizations with the aid of such principles as implied powers,
necessary intendment and functional necessity. The Treaty of
Rome is unusual among the treaties creating international
organizations in that it contains a provision, article 210, which
asserts that "[t]he Community shall have legal personality." In
context, this provision is clearly referring to international personality because the following article goes on to provide also for
the Community's legal capacity within its Member States. 76 There
is still plenty of room left open for interpretation of the precise extent of such legal personality.
Specific provisions of the Treaty of Rome take the matter further. Articles 111(2), 113 and 114 confer clear power to conclude
tariff and trade agreements. Article 238 permits the Community
to "conclude with a third country, a union of States or an international organization, agreements creating an association embodying
reciprocal rights and obligations, joint actions and special procedures."
Negotiations for agreements are conducted by the Commission. The Council of Ministers concludes the agreements after consulting the European Parliament. 77 In terms of the Treaty of
Rome, a qualified majority will suffice for the conclusion of trade
and tariff agreements 78 although this is not standard practice; as in
other areas of the operation of the Treaty, it is usual to seek consensus.
So much for the Treaty provisions on international
agreements. Practice of the Community has both expanded and
limited the provisions. Decisions of the European Court have
made it apparent that the treaty-making powers of the Community are not limited to the cases explicitly mentioned in the Treaty
75. Advisory Opinion on Reparation for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United
Nations [1949] I.C.J. 74. (The Court's reasoning relied heavily on the treaty-making power of
the United Nations.) And note the ongoing efforts of the International Law Commission to
produce a codification of the law on Treaties Concluded Between States and International
Organizations or Between International Organizations.
76. Treaty of Rome art. 211.
77. Treaty of Rome art. 228. At least this is what the Treaty says. In practice, the
Council participates more actively in the negotiation than the Treaty might suggest.
78. Treaty of Rome art. 114.
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of Rome. In the ERTA case, 79 it was held that the reference in article 210 to the "legal personality" of the Community indicates
that "in its external relations the Community enjoys the capacity
to establish contractual links with third countries over the whole
field of objectives" laid down in part one of the Treaty. (In the
ERTA case the objective was the "Common Transport Policy"
governed by title IV of the Treaty.) According to the Court in
ERTA, treaty-making power may be exercised "in particular each
time the Community, with a view to implementing a common
policy provided for in the Treaty has laid down provisions by
which common rules are introduced in one form or another ." 80
Subsequent decisions have held that it is not necessary for the
Community to have actually laid down common internal rules for
the treaty making power to come into play. 81 Further, the Court
has held that in many instances the Community's foreign relations
power is exclusive, and Member States may no longer be able to
act unilaterally. In the OECD case, involving negotiations on a
local cost standard in respect of export credits, the Court remarked that:
To accept the contrary were true would amount to recognizing
that in relations with third countries, Member States may adopt
positions which differ from those which the Community intends
to adopt, and would thereby distort the institutional framework,
call into question the mutual trust within the Community and
prevent the latter from fulfilling its task in the defence of the
common interest. 82

What is plain from all of this is that the activity of treatymaking is one that is subject to pragmatic expansion in the life of
the Community. It is only fair to add that the membership of the
79. Re the European Road Transport Agreement, Commission v. Council, Case No.
22/70 [1971) E.C.R. 263, 274.
80. Id.
81. The existence of the power to lay down internal rules is sufficient. Opinion of the
Court Given Pursuant to Article 228(1) of the EEC Treaty, Opinion No. 1/76 [1977) E.C.R.
741. A source of treaty-making authority beyond even this was suggested by the Commission in its Memorandum on Accession of the European Communities to the European Convention on Human Rights, supra note 73, at 20, when it argued that particular action might
be based on art. 235 of the Treaty of Rome which permits appropriate provisions to be
adopted if such action appears necessary to achieve the objectives of the Community.
82. Opinion of the Court Given Pursuant to Article 228(1) of the EEC Treaty, Opinion
No. 1/75 [1975] E.C.R. 1355.
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Community, so far as its views are reflected by the Council rather
than the Commission or the Court, has shown some ambivalence
about exercising the Community's powers to the hilt. One
manifestation of this ambivalence has been the use of the so-called
"mixed procedure," where not only the Community becomes party
to the agreement but also the Member States individually. The
most striking use of this procedure is the Lome Convention, an
association agreement concluded with a number of developing
Asian, Pacific and Caribbean States. 83 Article 238 of the Treaty of
Rome, which permits the conclusion of association agreements, appears to be broadly worded enough to make participation by the
Member States unnecessary, although unanimity is required in
the Council. Nevertheless, they were included. The Council, in
determining to act this way, seems to have narrowed the scope of
the solo treaty-making powers of the Community to tariff and commercial agreements that come within the precise terms of articles
111 and 113 of the Treaty, rather than the much broader approach
that is supported by the language of article 238 and the Court's
decisions. Then there is the case of the negotiations concerning
the European Road Transport Agreement. In spite of its ringing
support for Community power once action had been taken to harmonize Community laws on certain areas of road transportation, 84
the Court found it necessary to acquiesce in a fait accompli
whereby the Council had agreed that the Member States acting in
concert (and not the Community) would carry on negotiations with
other European countries and become parties to the final agreement. Again, in the case of the OECD Understanding on a Local
Cost Standard, 85 notwithstanding the Court's 1975 opinion as to
the exclusivity of Community power, for a lengthy period, France,
West Germany, Italy and the United Kingdom entered into what
amounted to individual understandings with Canada, Japan and
the United States, until an informal "arrangement" was eventual83. The current Treaty (Lome II) is reproduced in 19 INT'L LEGAL MAT'LS 341 (1980).
On the previous agreements with the developing countries, see g-enerally THE LOME CON VENTION AND A NEW INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ORDER (F. Alting von Geasu ed. 1977); Simmonds, The Lome Convention: Implementation and Renegotiation, 16 C.M.L. REV. 425 (1979).
84. Supra note 79. For another recent example of the Court's support for the Commission's position about Community power against the Council's denial of power, see Re the
Draft International Agreement on Natural Rubber, Opinion 1/78 (1979) C.M.L.R. 639.
85.. Supra note 82.
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ly reached in 1978 between the Community and those three countries.86
V.

CONCLUSION

This paper has focused on what are arguably three of the
most important juridical features of the European Community
when that entity is viewed as an example of integration. Each
raises issues of supranationality in one or more of the four senses
of that term outlined above: 87
- Power to make decisions by majority vote (Council in certain law-making and treaty-making roles)
- Substantial authority conferred upon organs composed of
persons other than governmental representatives (Commission and Court of Justice)
- Competence of agencies to deal directly and authoritatively
with firms and individuals within Member States (Commission, Council and Court roles in the Community legal order)
- Power formerly exercised by sovereign states transferred
to the new entity (Council in its law-making and treatymaking activities, Court, Commission in law-making and
law-enforcement roles).
But the situation is not one of unrelieved progression towards
greater supranationality and greater integration. Any complete
assessment of European integration has to place alongside these
examples of the development of the integrative process the many
examples of reluctance to give new powers to Community organs
and even a reluctance to allow them to exercise fully the powers
that seem to have been given them by the Treaty of Rome.
86. BULL. EUR. COMM. 2-1979, point 2.2.35.
87. See text accompanying supra note 10.
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